So hopefully you are following me still. I have established that the courts are Public Trustees, they are on Notice of their rightful place. Next comes the Executor’s Directive to the Public Trustee(s)
So what does this do? Well for one it pisses them off to no end, most of these people will be confused & some will believe that they don’t have to abide by anything I say, or will assume I am incorrect in my assertions. But… They will be incorrect.
Remember in an earlier post I included the Judge’s Oath of PUBLIC Office? The “Official Bond” That is important, please go back & read it very carefully. Up til now it has been violated in every form
If you also remember in the last post the city listed themselves as a Municipal Corporation, AND a Plaintiff, HOW DO YOU CAUSE PERSONAL INJURY to an entity, to a corporation? If they try to claim they were a Nominal Plaintiff, then they are merely a fictitious person. If the only semblance of a plaintiff they can produce is their witnesses then they should be named the plaintiffs & it becomes a civil suit, over which I would easily prevail.
IF THEY ARE THE PLAINTIFF IN THE CASE THEY CAN NOT BE THE EXECUTOR. AT NO TIME DID I EVER DISCLAIM MY RIGHTS TO MY ESTATE WITH THE FULL KNOWLEDGE OF CONSENT. NO ONE CAN BE THE TRUSTEE WHO IS THE BENEFICIARY, ADMINISTRATOR OR EXECUTOR, BUT AN EXECUTOR CAN BE & IS THE BENEFICIARY & THE ADMINISTRATOR
In order to help you understand I have included a list or Glossary of Terms as defined as in Black’s Law Dictionary, so that you can also the UNLIMITED double talk of the laws & definitions (((sigh)))
IN RERUM NATURA
In the nature of things; in the realm of actuality; in existence.In a dilatory plea, an allegation that the plaintiff is not in rerum natura is equivalent to averring that the person named is fictitious
NE UNQUES EXECUTOR
L. Fr. Never executor. The name of a plea by which the defendant denies that he is an executor, as he is alleged to be; or that the Plaintiff is an executor, as he claims to be.
A party, plaintiff or defendant, who sues out a writ or other process, orappears to conduct his case in court himself, instead of through a solicitor or counsel, is said to act and appear in person.
A defense which insists that the plaintiff never had the right to institute the suit, or that, if he had, the original right is extinguished or determined.
BRANDIA TAAMU Estate
EXECUTOR’S DIRECTIVE TO THE PUBLIC TRUSTEES
1) We would like the full sub-total listed in the fee schedule to be paid immediately to Ms TAAMU’S Estate with the balance to be determined at a later date. Along with the payment of the bond taken out in this cause number which rightfully belongs to the Estate of Ms TAAMU
2) Ms Taamu has by notice on this day rescinded her signature on all documents and revoked all city, county and state agents authority in all matters to do with her Estate and with the City of Everett’s cause # CRP003735. We assert there is no cause and at no time with clear and sound mind did she agree with any of the matter in front of the court as evidenced by Ms Taamu’s repeated attempts at trying to resolve this matter under duress per minas* intimidation*, exaction*, collusion*, oppression*, color of title*, and color of authority* and absolute terror of retribution or the murder and deprivation of Ms Taamu’s animals. We do not recognize* you nor do we agree* to your governance
3) We want the matter dissolved immediately, and Ms Taamu’s involvement in this matter all records thereof expunged immediately. We would also like absolute proof as to the state’s claim to be a “Plaintiff” in this case, citing specifically how they were personally injured by Ms Taamu’s actions.
4) If this matter is not disposed in writing within 72 hours of this notice we will take it as an agreement to pay Ms Taamu’s fee schedule in full within 14 days of this notice from this date instead of the short bill submitted today. The full summary to be submitted at the end of the 72hr period.
5) If this matter is continued let it be known that MS TAAMU’S Estate will in fact represent themselves appearing “in person”* and all prior agreements, contracts, signatures by Ms Taamu and agents acting in behalf of her without her authority are now rescinded. it is acknowledged that Ms Taamu has the “RIGHT” to counsel, she does not have the “OBLIGATION” to accept counsel. The courts can not in fact deny or grant a “Inalienable Right” that is already guaranteed in the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Law of the Land, unless of course the courts can show how they are above the Constitution. Nor can they grant or deny “Unalienable Rights” granted by God,
6) Let it also be known that at no time did Ms TAAMU or her Estate enter in an agreement or contract with the Everett animal shelter nor it’s foster care system and there is no debt real or implied with either or. It was in fact the courts which entered into an agreement with the city of Everett animal shelter and all agents thereof.
7) We demand the immediate return of the desecrated corpse of Ms Taamu’s pet dog a 14 yr old American Eskimo named George is to be returned within 72 hours of this notice as well as the immediate delivery of all of Ms Taamu’s property and live animals namely Hoki, Soffia, Libby, Misty, Taz and the whereabouts of Ms Taamu’s cat Lilly a grey and white manx female cat reportedly picked up by Everett animal care and control authorities, must be made known immediately
8) THIS DIRECTIVE IS GIVEN THIS DAY TO:
Mike Fisher the city of Everett prosecutor and all agents of said office
Judge David Mitchell city of Everett judge and all agents thereof
Douglas Franklin Ricks a contracted agent of the city of Everett
Mayor Ray Stephanson, and all agents thereof
City attorney James Iles and all agents thereof
The city of Everett Council and all agents thereof
The clerks in the city of Everett and all agents thereof
The city of Everett animal control and all agents thereof
The city of Everett Police dept and agents thereof
The county of Snohomish and all agents thereof
The state of Washington and all agents thereof
(Including all law enforcement all employees, and all contractors and all agents thereof)
9) We are also calling for a complete accounting of all monies spent on Ms Taamu’s case, in work hours, filings, man hours, court appearances, research, laboratories, outside agencies, internet records of the said officers involved in the cause before the courts. including a copy of the presiding Judge David C Mitchell, the city attorney James Iles, and the city prosecutor Mike Fisher “Official Bond” to be delivered within 14 days of this notice.
This entire cause has been nothing more than a very thinly veiled attempt at usurpation*, the denial of beneficial enjoyment of her own property, and subtraction under distress* with clear intent of Deforcement, disseisin, abatement, discontinuance, and intrusion. We submit that all parties would be remiss in their fiduciary duties to not consent to the law. Let it be known that at no time time did Ms Taamu disclaim her Inalienable Rights nor her Unalienable Rights, as her own Executor, nor did she at any time knowingly agree to make the courts or any of the involved actors the Administrator, Beneficiary or Executor of her Estate.
On this 22nd day of our Lord in December of 2011 in the city of Lynnwood, in the county of Snohomish in the state of Washington
EXECUTOR, ADMINSTRATOR AND BENEFICIARY OF
THE ESTATE OF BRANDIA TAAMU (Electronic Signature)
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
1) DURESS PER MINAS Duress by threats. The use of threats and menaces to compel a person, by the fear of death, or grievous bodily harm, as mayhem or loss of limb, to do some lawful act, or to commit a misdemeanor. 1 Bl. Comm. 130; 4 Bl. Comm. 30; 4 Steph. Comm. 83. See METUS
2) INTIMIDATION In English law. Every person commits a misdemeanor, punishable with a fine or imprisonment, who wrongfully uses violence to or intimidates any other person, or his wife or children, with a view to compel him to abstain from doing, or to do, any act which he has a legal right to do, or abstain from doing. (St. 38 & 39 Vict, c. 80,
3) EXACTION The wrongful act of an officer or other person in compelling payment of a fee or reward for his services, under color of his official authority, where no payment Is due. Between “extortion” and “exaction” there is this difference: that in the former case the officer extorts more than his due, when something is due to him; in the latter, he exacts what is not his due, when there is nothing due to him. Co. Litt. 368.
4) COLLUSION A deceitful agreement or compact between two or more persons, for the one party to bring an action against the other for some evil purpose, as to defraud a third party of his right Cowell. A secret arrangement between two or more persons, whose interests are apparently conflicting, to make use of the forms and proceedings of law in order to defraud a third person, or to obtain that which justice would not give them, by deceiving a court or it officers. Baldwin v. New York, 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 359; Belt v. Blackburn, 28 Md. 235; Railroad Co. v. Gay. 8G Tex. 571, 26 S. W. 599, 25 L. R. A. 52; Balch v. Beach, 119 Wis. 77, 95 N. W. 132.
5) OPPRESSION The misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inllicts upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury. 1 Russ. Crimes, 297; Steph. Dig. Crim. Law, 71. See U. S. v. Deaver (D. C.) 14 Fed. 597.
6) EXTORTION Any oppression by color or pretense of right, and particularly the exaction by an officer of money, by color of his office, either when none at all is due, or not so much is due. or wen it Is not yet due. Preston v. Bacon, 4 Conn. 4S0.Extortion consists in any public officer unlawfully taking, by color of his office, from any person any money or thing of value that is not due to him. or more than his due.
7) COLOR OF TITLE The appearance, semblance, or simulacrum of title. Any fact, extraneous to the act or mere will of the claimant, which has the appearance, on its face, of supporting his claim of a present title to land, but which, for some defect, in reality falls short of establishing it. Wright v. Mattison, 18 How. 56, 15 L. Ed. 280; Cameron v. U. S
8) COLOR OF AUTHORITY That semblance or presumption of authority sustaining the acts of a public officer which is derived from his apparent title to the office or from a writ or other process in his hands apparently valid and regular. State v. Oates, 80 Wis. 634, 57 N. W. 290, 39 Am. St. Rep. 912; Wyatt v. Monroe, 27 Tex. 208.
9) JUS PENITENDI In Roman law, the right of rescission or revocation of an executory contract 011 failure of the other party to fulfill his part of the agreement. See Mackeld. Rom. Law,
10) USURPATION Torts. THE UNLAWFUL ASSUMPTION OF THE USE OF PROPERTY WHICH BELONGS TO ANOTHER; AN INTERRUPTION OR THE DISTURBING A MAN IN HIS RIGHT AND POSSESSION. Tomlins. IN PUBLIC LAW. THE UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OR ASSUMPTION OF SOVEREIGN POWER; the assunip- P lion of government or supreme power by force or illegally, in derogation of the constitution and of the rights of the lawful ruler.
11) BENEFICIAL ENJOYMENT The enjoyment which a man has of an estate in his own right and for his own benefit, and not as trustee for another. 11 H. L. Cas. 271.
12) SUBTRACTION The offense of withholding or withdrawing from another man what by law he is entitled to. There are various descriptions of this offense, of which the principal are as follows: (1) Subtraction of suit and services, which is a species of injury affecting a man’s real property, and consists of a withdrawal of (or a neglect to perform or pay) the fealty, suit of court, rent, or services reserved by the lessor of the land.
13) DISTRESS The taking of beasts or other personal property by way of pledge, to enforce the performance of something due from the party distrained upon. 3 Bl. Comm. 231. THE TAKING OF A DEFENDANT’S GOODS, IN ORDER TO COMPEL AN APPEARANCE IN COURT. Id. 2S0; 3 Steph. Comm. 301, 363. Also the thing taken by distraining, that which is seized to procure satisfaction.
14) DEFORCEMENT Deforcement Is where a man wrongfully holds lands to which another person is entitled. It therefore includes disseisin, abatement, discontinuance,and intrusion. Co. Litt. 2776, 3316; Foxworth v. White, 5 Strob. (S. C.) 115; Woodruff v.Brown, 17 N. J. Law, 2G9; Hopper v. Hopper, 21 N. J. Law, 543.
15) FIDUCIARY The term is derived from the Roman law, and means (as a noun) aperson holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to that of a trustee,in respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good faith and candor which it requires. Thus, a person Is a fiduciary who is invested with rights and powers to be exercised for the benefit of another person. Svanoe v. Jurgens, 144 111.507, 33 N. E. 955; Stoll v. King, 8 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 299.As an adjective it means of the nature of a trust; having the characteristics of atrust; analogous to a trust; relating to or founded upon a trust or confidence.
16) DISCLAIMER The repudiation or renunciation of a right or claim vested in a person of which he had formerly alleged to be his. The refusal, waiver, or denial of an estate or right offered to a person. The disavowal, denial, or renunciation of an Interest, right, or property imputed to a person or alleged to be his. Also the declaration, or the instrument, by which such disclaimer is published. Moores v. Clackamas County, 40 Or.536, 67 Pac. 662.Of estates. The act by which a party refuses to accept an estate which has been conveyed to him. Thus, a trustee is said to disclaim who releases to his fellow-trustees his estate, and relieves himself of the trust. Watson v. Watson, 13 Conn. 85; KentuckyUnion Co. v. Cornett, 112 Ky. 677, 66 S. W. 728.
17) INALIENABLE NOT SUBJECT TO ALIENATION ; THE CHARACTERISTIC OF THOSE THINGS WHICH CANNOT BE BOUGHT OR SOLD OR TRANSFERRED FROM ONE PERSON TO ANOTHER, SUCH AS RIVERS AND PUBLIC HIGHWAYS, AND CERTAIN PERSONAL RIGHTS; E. G., LIBERTY.
18) DEFALCATION The act of a defaulter; misappropriation of trust funds or moneyheld in any fiduciary capacity; failure to properly account for such funds. Usually spokenof oliicers of corporations or public ollicials. In re Butts (D. C.) 120 Fed. 970; Crawfordv. Burke, 201 111. 581, 06 N. E. 833.Also set-off. The dimiuution of a debt or claim by deducting from it a smaller claim held by the debtor or payor. Iron Works v. Cuppey, 41 Iowa, 104; liouk v. Foley, 2 Pen.& W. (Pa.) 250; McDonald v. Lee, 12 La. 435.
19) ADMINISTRATOR In the most usual sense of the word, is a person to whom letters of administration, that is, an authority to administer the estate of a deceased person, have been granted by the proper court He resembles an executor, but, being appointed by the court, and not by the deceased, he has to give security for the due administration of the estate, by entering into a bond with sureties, called the administration bond. Smith v. Gentry, 16 Ga. 31; Collamore v. Wilder, 19 Kan. 78. In the civil law. A manager of public affairs in behalf of others. Calvin. A public oflicer, ruler, or governor. Nov. 95, gl.; Cod. 12, 8.
20) OFFICIAL BOND A bond given by a public officer, conditioned that he shall well and faithfully perform all the duties of the office. The term is sometimes made to include the bonds of executors, guardians, trustees, etc.
21) INTERMEDDLE To interfere with property or the conduct of business affairs officiously or without right or title. Mc Queen v. Babcock, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 339; In re Shinn’s Estate, ICC Pa. 121, 30 Atl. 1020, 45 Am. St. Rep. G50. Not a technical legal term, but sometimes used with reference to the acts of an executor de son tort or a ncgotiorum gcstor iu the civil law.
22) DE SON TORT TORT. L. Fr. Of his own wrong. A stranger who takes upon him to act as an executor without any just authority is called an “executor of his own wrong,” (de son tort.) 2 Bl. Comm. 507; 2 Steph. Comm. 244.
23) FREE 1. Unconstrained; having power to follow the dictates of his own will. Not subject to the dominion of another. Not compelled to involuntary servitude. Used in this sense as opposed to “slave.”2. Not bound to service for a fixed term of years; in distinction to being bound as an apprentice.3. Enjoying full civic rights.4. Available to all citizens alike without charge; as a free school.5. Available for public use without charge or toll; as a free bridge.6. Not despotic; assuring liberty; defending individual rights against encroachment by any person or class; instituted by a free people; said of governments, institutions, etc.
24) DELICT In the Roman and civil law. A wrong or Injury: an offense; a violation of public or private duty.It will be observed that this word, taken in its most general sense, is wider in both directions than our English term “tort.” On the one hand, it includes those wrongful acts which, while directly affecting some individual or his property, yet extend in their injurious consequences to the peace or security of the community at large, and hence rise to the grade of crimes or misdemeanors. These acts were termed in the Roman law”public delicts:” while those for which the only penalty exacted was compensation to the person primarily injured were denominated “private delicts.” On the other hand, the term appears to have included injurious actions which transpired without any malicious intention on the part of the doer. Thus Pothier gives the name “quasi delicts” to the acts of a person who, without malignity, but by an inexcusable imprudence, causes an injury to another. Poth. Obi. 110. Rut the term is used in modern jurisprudence as a convenient synonym of “tort;” that is, a wrongful and injurious violation of a jus it. remor right available against all the world. This appears in the two contrasted phrases,”actions ex contractu” and “actions ex delicto.”Quasi delict. An act whereby a person, without malice, but by fault, negligence, or prudence not legally excusable, causes injury to another. Qui judex litem suam Jecit, being the offense of partiality or excess in thejudex, (juryman;) e. y., in assessing the damages at a ligure iu excess of the extremelimit permitted by the formula. Torts commuted by one’s agents (t y., stable-boys, shop-managers, etc.) in the course of their employment. Brown.
25) PUBLIC TRUSTEE: RCW 42.52.010 Definitions “State officer” means every person holding a position of PUBLIC OFFICE in or under an executive, legislative, or judicial office of the state. “State officer” includes judges of the superior court, judges of the court of appeals, justices of the supreme court, members of the legislature together with the secretary of the senate and the chief clerk of the house of representatives, holders of elective offices in the executive branch of state government, chief executive officers of state agencies, members of boards, commissions, or committees with authority over one or more state agencies or institutions, and employees of the state who are engaged in supervisory, policy-making, or policy-enforcing work. For the purposes of this chapter, “state officer” also includes any person exercising or undertaking to exercise the powers or functions of a state officer.
26) INTEGRITY As occasionally used in statutes prescribing the qualifications of public officers, trustees, etc., this term means soundness of moral principle and character, as shown by one person dealing with others in the making and performance of contracts, and fidelity and honesty in the discharge of trusts; it is . synonymous with “probity,” “honesty,” and “uprightness.” In re Bau- quier’s Estate, 88 Cal. 302, 26 Pac. 178; In re Gordons Estate, 142 Cal. 125, 75 Pac. 672.
27) OFFICE An employment on behalf of the government in any station or PUBLIC TRUST, not merely transient, occasional, or incidental. In re Attorneys’ Oaths, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 493. The most frequent occasions to use the word arise with reference to a duty and power conferred on an individual by the government; and, when this is the connection, “public office” is a usual and more discriminating expression. It is a general rule that a judicial office cannot be exercised by deputy, while a ministerial one may. Waldo v. Wallace, 12 Ind. 569. “Office” Is frequently used in the old books as an abbreviation for “inquest of office,” (q. v.)
28) JUDGE A PUBLIC OFFICER, appointed to preside and to administer the law in a court of justice; the chief member of a court, and charged with the control of proceedings and the decision of questions of law or discretion. Todd v. U. S
29) PROSECUTING ATTORNEY The name of the PUBLIC OFFICER (in several states) who is appointed in each judicial district, circuit, or county, to conduct criminal prosecutions on behalf of the state or people. See People v. May, 3 Mich. 605; Holder v. State, 58 Ark. 473, 25 S. W. 279.
30) INCOMPATIBLE Two or more relations, offices, functions, or rights which cannot naturally, or may not legally, exist in or be exercised by the same person at the same time, are said to be incompatible. Thus, the relations of lessor and lessee of the same land, in one person at the same time, are incompatible. So of trustee and beneficiary of the same property. See People v. Greeu, 4G How. Prac.
31) DISSEISIN Dispossession; a deprivation of possession; a privation of seisin; ausurpation of the right of seisin and possession, and an exercise of such powers and privileges of ownership as to keep out or displace him to whom these rightfully belong.3 Washb. Real Prop. 125; Probst v. Trustees, 129 U. S. 182, 9 Sup. Ct. 263, 32 L. Ed.642; Bond v. O’Gara, 177 Mass. 139, 58 N. E. 275, 83 Am. St. Rep. 265; Moody v.Fleming, 4 Ga. 115, 48 Am. Dec. 210; Clapp v. Bromagbam, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 553; Washburnv. Cutter, 17 Minn. 368 (Gil. 335).It is a wrongful putting out of him that is seised of the freehold, not, as in abatement or intrusion, a wrongful entry, where the possession was vacant, but an attack upon him who Is in actual possession, and turning him out. It is an ouster from a freehold in deed, as abatement and intrusion are ousters in law. 3 Steph. Comm. 386.When one man invades the possession of an- other, and by force or surprise turns him out of the occupation of his lands, this is termed a “disseisin,” being a deprivation of that actual seisin or corporal possession of the freehold which the tenant before enjoyed. In other words, a disseisin is said to be when one enters intending to usurp the possession, and to oust another from the freehold. To constitute an entry adisseisin, there must be an ouster of the freehold, either by taking the profits or by claiming the inheritance. Brown. According to the modern authorities, there seems to be no legal difference between the words “seisin” and “possession,” although there is a difference between the words”disseisin” and “dispossession;” the former meaning an estate gained by wrong and injury, whereas the latter may be by right or by wrong; the former denoting an ouster of the disseisee, or some act equivalent to it, whereas by the latter no such act is implied. Slater v. Rawson, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 439.Disseisinam satis facit, qui ntl non permittit possessorem, vel minns commode, licetomnino non expellat. Co.Litt. 331. He makes disseisin enough who does not permit the possessor to enjoy, or makes his enjoyment less beneficial, although he does not expel him altogether.
32) TRUST 1. An equitable or beneficial right or title to land or other property, held for the beneficiary by another person, in whom resides the legal title or ownership, recognized and enforced by courts of chancery. See Goodwin v. McMinn, 193 Pa. 046, 44 Atl. 1094, 74 Am. St. Rep. 703; Beers v. Lyon, 21 Conn. 613; Seymour v. Freer, 8 Wall. 202, 19 L. Ed. 300. An obligation arising out of a confidence reposed in the trustee or representative, who has the legal title to property conveyed to him, that he will faithfully apply the property according to the confidence reposed, or, in other words, according to the wishes of the grantor of the trust. 4 Kent Comm. 304; Willis, Trustees, 2; Beers v. Lyon, 21 Conn. 613; Thornburg v. Buck, 13 Ind. App. 446, 41 N. E. 85. An equitable obligation, either express or Implied, resting upon a person by reason of a confidence reposed in him, to apply or deal with the property for the benefit of some other person, or for the benefit of himself and another or others, according to such confidence. McCreary v. Gewinner, 103 Ga. 528, 29 S. E. 9G0. A holding of property subject to a duty of employing it or applying its proceeds ac- cording to directions given by the person from whom it was derived. Munroe v. Crouse. 59 Hun. 248, 12 N. Y. Supp. 815.
33) TRUSTEE THE PERSON APPOINTED, OR REQUIRED BY LAW, TO EXECUTE A TRUST; one in whom an estate, interest, or power is vested, under an express or implied agreement to administer or exercise it for the benefit or to the use of another.
34) ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES An administrator ad colligendum is the mere agent or officer of the court to collect and preserve the goods of the subject until some one is clothed with authority to administer them, and cannot complain that another is appointed administrator in chief. Flora v. Mennice, 12 Ala. 830.
35) MISCONDUCT Any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause; as “misconduct of jurors,” “misconduct of an arbitrator.” The term is also used to express a dereliction from duty, injurious to another, on the part of one employed in a professional capacity, as an attorney at law, (Stage v. Stevens, 1 Denio [N. Y.] 267,) or a public officer, (State v. Leach, 60 Me. 58, 11 Am. Rep. 172.)
36) TORT Wrong injury; the opposite of right So called, according to Lord Coke, be cause it is wrested, or crooked, being contrary to that which is right and straight. Co. Litt 1586. In modern practice, tort is constantly used as au English word to denote a wrong or wrongful act, for which an action will lie, as distinguished from a contract. 3 Bl. Comm. 117. A TORT IS A LEGAL WRONG COMMITTED UPON THE PERSON OR PROPERTY INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT. It may be either (1) a direct invasion of some legal right of the individual; (2) the infraction of some public duty by which special damage accrues to the individual; (3) the violation of some private obligation by which like damage accrues to the individual. In the former case, no special damage is necessary to entitle the party to recover. In the two latter cases, such damage is necessary. Code Ga. 18S2,
37) IN INVITUM Against an unwilling party; against one not assenting. A term appliedto proceedings against an adverse party, to which he does not consent.
38) REPLEVIN A personal action ex delicto brought to recover possession of goods unlawfully taken, (generally, but not only, applicable to the taking of goods distrained for rent,) the validity of which taking it is the mode of contesting, if the party from whom the goods were taken wishes to have them back in specie, whereas, if he prefer to have damages instead, the validity may be contested by action of trespass or unlawful distress. The word means a redelivery to the owner of the pledge or thing taken in distress. Wharton. And see Sinnott v. Feiock, 165 N. Y. 444, 59 N. E. 265, 53 L. R. A. 565, 80 Am. St. Rep. 736; Healey v. Humphrey, 81 Fed. 990, 27 C. C. A. 39; Mc- Junkin v. Mathers, 158 Pa. 137, 27 Atl. 873; Tracy v. Warren, 104 Mass. 377; Lazard v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 142: Maclary v. Turner, 9 Houst. (Del.) 281. 32 Atl. 325; Johnson v. Boehme. 66 Kan. 72, 71 Pac. 243, 97 Am. St Rep. 357.
39) WRIT PRO RETORNO HABENDO A writ commanding the return of the goods to the defendant upon a judgment in his favor in replevin, upon the plaintiff’s default
40) TRESPASS Any misfeasance or act of oue man whereby another is injuriously treated or damnified. 3 Bl. Comm. 208. An injury or misfeasance to the person, property, or rights of another person, done with force and violence, either actual or implied in law. See Grunson v. State, 89 Ind. 530, 46 Am. Rep. 178; Southern Ity. Co. v. Harden, 101 Ga. 203, 28 S. E. 847; Blood v. Kemp, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 173; Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. McLaughlin, 03 111. 391; Agnew v. Jones, 74 Miss. 347, 23 South. 25; Hill v. Kimball. 70 Tex. 210, 13 S. W. 59, 7 L. R. A. 618. Trespass, in its most comprehensive sense, signifies any transgression or offense against the law of nature, of society, or of the country in which we live; and this, whether it relates to a man’s person or to his property. In its more limited and ordinary sense, it signifies an injury committed with violence, and this violence may be either actual or implied; and the law will imply violence though none is actually used, when the injury is of a direct and immediate kind, and committed on the person or tangible and corporeal property of the plaintiff. Of actual violence, an assault and battery is an instance; of implied, a peaceable but wrongful entry upon a person’s land. Brown. In practice. A form of action, at the common law, which lies for redress in the shape of money damages for any unlawful ipjury done to the plaintiff, in respect either to his person, property, or rights, by the immediate force and violence of the defendant.
Consensus facit legem. Consent makes the law. A contract is a law between the parties, which can acquire force only by consent.