Here is my Affidavit of Truth, REMEMBER when you walk into a courtroom, the Judge is NOT GOD, the Prosecutor is nothing more than YOUR public employee, they are not above the law, they have no real power over you, & you need to remind them of that. Especially if you are facing the kinds I am, they are NOTHING more than public trustees, whether they are elected, hired or contracted, you are NOT beholden to them, they are in fact beholden to you, it is your tax dollars that pay their wages. They are supposed to administer Justice, not their egos. Generally I strongly advocate respect for the courts & it’s officers. I was raised by Prosecutors, Judges, Cops & I know the difference between those who operate with integrity & those who don’t. If I had been in front of any one with any integrity this case would’ve been dismissed 10 months ago on lack of merit alone but again this is a clash of their precious ego’s….
I mean seriously WHO EVER HEARD OF 50 COURT APPEARANCES FOR A MISDEMEANOR CASE???? It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to see this for what it is. I am going to be very interested in hearing their explanation in a Tort Trial, actually I wish I could be a fly on the proverbial wall when their Surety Company gets my notice. ALWAYS go after their bonds, once they can’t be bonded it doesn’t matter what the Bar does (or doesn’t do), or any state commission, if they can’t be bonded they can’t work.
In 3 days it will make 1 yr since I have seen my own animals… Someone is going to pay for this, with the ONLY things that mean anything to them, by them harassing & intimidating me, & violating just about every single “Right” I have as a Human Being, they have created their own little monster & then set it loose on themselves. They took my life, my liberty, my rights but worst yet my babies, so I will take their money & their power to abuse others the way they have gotten used to treating so many other people.
THIS DOCUMENT IS A MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD
UNTIL THE ENTIRE MATTER IS STRICKEN
CITY OF EVERETT (A Municipal Corporation)
( AFFIDAVIT OF TRUTH
( NOTICE OF DEFAULT
BRANDIA TAAMU (Estate)
Affidavit of Truth
Comes now the Executor of the Estate of BRANDIA TAAMU, the true plaintiff in this matter before the court for which there is no cause. We are assuming that since there was no rebuttal to the Executor’s Directive or Appointment that the matter (which was sent on December 23rd 2011 at which time the city was given 72 hours to respond) is agreed upon by the court and that Ms Taamu’s Animals and Property are to be returned immediately, and that the court has disposed of the matter for which there is no cause. We have yet to receive any communication whether by email , mail or telephone that let’s us know when we can retrieve Ms Taamu’s Animals and Property and that payment of Ms Taamu’s Fee Schedule is forthcoming within 14 days of the filing of the Directive, the Appointment or the Fee Schedule. Nor have we received a copy of the Surety or Bond as requested for Judge David C Mitchell James D Iles, or Prosecutor Mike A Fisher.
We have also not received the City’s proof that they are a Plaintiff in the case and showing their own personal injuries, and as stated in the charging papers: The City is in fact a Municipal Corporation, not a flesh and blood human being. If it is in fact the City’s intent to proceed where there is no cause then let these Statements of Fact stand to be memorialized for Future Cause, Cause Ms Taamu can claim. The city has also failed to prove their standing & jurisdiction in the matter before the courts, nor has the exact Nature and Cause of the matter been established as the result of the refusal to disclose all discovery in the matter. This being the 3rd request which puts the City in default, since no rebuttal has been offered or made since you were put on notice. If not rebutted within 15 DAYS by lawful evidence to the contrary, this affidavit is at law evidence that the court has not joined the true party of interest and a default exists. Failure to present evidence to the contrary of the Affiants testimony, will be evidence that all parties stipulate to the facts herein as true, correct and complete. Wherefore the court should dismiss the case sua sponte for failure to join an indispensable party as such relieves the court of jurisdiction over the parties.
On January 6th 2011 the City of Everett’s agents did extorsively take Ms Taamu’s Animals and Property in collusion and under exaction, color of title, color of authority, and oppression. Denying Ms Taamu’s beneficial enjoyment of her property and animals and to initiate the matter before the court and did hereby bring a cause before the court against Ms Taamu In Invitum. Actus me invito factus, non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will, is not my act. At which time Ms Taamu was also denied access to her animals to have a vet examine them and were taken from Ms Taamu’s care, warm, safe and dry but showed up at the shelter some 5 to 7 hrs later, bleeding from the rectum, bloody, missing teeth, hypothermic, wet and having seizures. The property and animals as described
1) George-a 14yr old deceased American Eskimo Dog
2) Hoki- a 9yr old Australian Kelpie Dog
3) Soffia- a 12yr old German Schnauzer Dog
4) Misty- a 5yr old Toy Australian Shepherd Dog
5) Libby- a 3yr old Pomeranian mix Dog
6) Taz- a 6yr old Domestic Short hair Cat
7,8,9) All kennels, blankets, and medications also seized on the same day
On February 2nd the City of Everett did bring false charges against Ms Taamu listing themselves as a Municipal Corporation AND a Plaintiff but at no time showed any real personal injury to a flesh and blood person. Using Ms Taamu’s name BRANDIA ALIDA MAREA TAAMU to create a bond with which to make Capital gains for the City of Everett, which rightfully belong to the Estate of Ms Taamu.
On February 16th the City of Everett did force Ms Taamu into a contract with the city under intimidation, duress per minas, exaction, collusion, oppression, color of title, and color of authority* under the “Washington State Constitution”. Consensus facit legem. Consent makes the law. A contract is a law between the parties, which can acquire force only by consent. Article one of your constitution’s “Bill of Rights (Declaration of Rights)” states that “All political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to protect and maintain individual rights. All men are born equally free and independent” and that therefore, all government of right originates from the people, and “is founded in consent”. This means that in regards to your society’s “statutes” or “ordinances”, consent is required. Ms Taamu does not consent to your governance. Ms Taamu was not nor has ever been a “resident” of your city. As a free woman Ms Taamu and her Estate take responsibility for her actions and will do no harm to others or their property. Since your agents are not acting by the consent of the governed, then they are acting cohercively. Extracting undisclosed consent by any means un-neccesary.
****Again as Executor of the Estate of BRANDIA TAAMU I remind all parties that signatures and contracts in Jus Penitendi, made by Ms Taamu and all agents acting in her behalf who had no real true vested interest in Ms TAAMU’S Estate or real authority to sign in Ms Taamu’s behalf were in fact rescinded. Under the facts that all signatures, agreements or contracts were null and void as their true nature was never disclosed.
Ms Taamu has by THIRD notice on this day rescinded her signature on all documents and revoked all city, county and state agents authority in all matters to do with her Estate and with the City of Everett’s cause # CRP003735. That is undeniable. We assert there is no cause and at no time with clear and sound mind did she agree with any of the matter in front of the court as evidenced by Ms Taamu’s repeated attempts at trying to resolve this matter under duress per minas* intimidation*, exaction*, collusion*, oppression*, color of title*, and color of authority* and absolute terror of retribution or the murder and deprivation of Ms Taamu’s animals. We do not recognize* you nor do we agree* to your governance
Let it also be known that at no time did Ms Taamu or her Estate enter in an agreement or contract with the Everett animal shelter nor it’s foster care system and there is no debt real or implied with either or. It was in fact the courts which entered into an agreement with the city of Everett animal shelter and all agents thereof. On April 6th 2011
February 16th set the stage for almost 50 additional court appearances, loss of liberty, and freedom for Ms Taamu, the false cause bringing Ms Taamu to financial and emotional ruin. This entire cause has been nothing more than a very thinly veiled attempt at usurpation, the denial of beneficial enjoyment of her own property, and subtraction under distress with clear intent ofDeforcement, disseisin, abatement, discontinuance, and intrusion. We submit that all parties would be remiss in their fiduciary duties to not consent to the law. Furthermore, Ms Taamu is NOT a city, state, government or public employee to which you are trying to apply your rules to. We charge that it is in fact the City and it’s actors who are in violations of it’s own laws as follows:
DISTINGUISHING THE LAW:
Torts. THE UNLAWFUL ASSUMPTION OF THE USE OF PROPERTY WHICH BELONGS TO ANOTHER; AN INTERRUPTION OR THE DISTURBING A MAN IN HIS RIGHT AND POSSESSION. Tomlins. IN PUBLIC LAW. THE UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OR ASSUMPTION OF SOVEREIGN POWER;
The taking of beasts or other personal property by way of pledge, to enforce the performance of something due from the party distrained upon. 3 Bl. Comm. 231. THE TAKING OF A DEFENDANT’S GOODS, IN ORDER TO COMPEL AN APPEARANCE IN COURT. Id. 2S0; 3 Steph. Comm. 301, 363. Also the thing taken by distraining, that which is seized to procure satisfaction.
Any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause; as “misconduct of jurors,” “misconduct of an arbitrator.” The term is also used to express a dereliction from duty, injurious to another, on the part of one employed in a professional capacity, as an attorney at law, (Stage v. Stevens, 1 Denio [N. Y.] 267,) or a public officer, (State v. Leach, 60 Me. 58, 11 Am. Rep. 172.)
Deforcement Is where a man wrongfully holds lands to which another person is entitled. It therefore includes disseisin, abatement, discontinuance,and intrusion. Co. Litt. 2776, 3316; Foxworth v. White, 5 Strob. (S. C.) 115; Woodruff v.Brown, 17 N. J. Law, 2G9; Hopper v. Hopper, 21 N. J. Law, 543. But It is applied especially to cases, not falling under those heads, where the person entitled to the freehold has never had possession; thus, where a lord has a seignory, and lands escheat to him propter defectum sanguinis, but the seisin is withheld from him, this is a deforcement, and the personwho withholds the seisin is called a “deforceor.” 3 Bl. Comm. 172.In Scotch law. The opposition or resistance made to messengers or other public officers while they are actually engaged in the exercise of their offices. Ersk. lust. 4, 4, 32.
The act of a defaulter; misappropriation of trust funds or money held in any fiduciary capacity; failure to properly account for such funds. Usually spoken of officers of corporations or public officials. In re Butts (D. C.) 120 Fed. 970; Crawford v. Burke, 201 111. 581, 06 N. E. 833.Also set-off. The dimiuution of a debt or claim by deducting from it a smaller claim held by the debtor or payor. Iron Works v. Cuppey, 41 Iowa, 104; liouk v. Foley, 2 Pen.& W. (Pa.) 250; McDonald v. Lee, 12 La. 435.
In the rule that statutes should be so construed as to avoid ”inconvenience,” this means, as applied to the public, the sacrifice or jeopardizing of important public interests or hampering the legitimate activities of government or the transaction of public business, and, as applied to individuals, serious hardship or injustice. See Black, Iuterp. Laws, 102; Betls v. U. S., 132 Fed. 237, 05 C. C. A. 452.
Dispossession; a deprivation of possession; a privation of seisin; ausurpation of the right of seisin and possession, and an exercise of such powers and privileges of ownership as to keep out or displace him to whom these rightfully belong.3 Washb. Real Prop. 125; Probst v. Trustees, 129 U. S. 182, 9 Sup. Ct. 263, 32 L. Ed.642; Bond v. O’Gara, 177 Mass. 139, 58 N. E. 275, 83 Am. St. Rep. 265; Moody v.Fleming, 4 Ga. 115, 48 Am. Dec. 210; Clapp v. Bromagbam, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 553; Washburnv. Cutter, 17 Minn. 368 (Gil. 335). When one man invades the possession of an- other, and by force or surprise turns him out of the occupation of his lands, this is termed a “disseisin,” being a deprivation of that actual seisin or corporal possession of the freehold which the tenant before enjoyed. In other words, a disseisin is said to be when one enters intending to usurp the possession, and to oust another from the freehold. To constitute an entry adisseisin, there must be an ouster of the freehold, either by taking the profits or by claiming the inheritance. Brown. According to the modern authorities, there seems to be no legal difference between the words “seisin” and “possession,” although there is a difference between the words”disseisin” and “dispossession;” the former meaning an estate gained by wrong and injury, whereas the latter may be by right or by wrong; the former denoting an ouster of the disseisee, or some act equivalent to it, whereas by the latter no such act is implied. Slater v. Rawson, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 439.
In criminal law. A term used to signify every considerable misdemeanor which has not a certain name given to it by law.. 3 Inst. 30. But more particularly and properly the term denotes either (1) a contempt against the sovereign, the government, or the courts of justice, including not only contempts of court, properly so called, but also all forms of seditious or disloyal conduct and lezemajesty; (2) maladministration of high public office, including peculation of the public funds; (3) neglect or light account made of a crime, that is, failure in the duty of a citizen to endeavor to prevent the commission of a crime, or, having knowledge of its commission, to reveal It to the proper authorities. See 4 Bl. Comm. 119- 120.
9) DURESS PER MINAS
Duress by threats. The use of threats and menaces to compel a person, by the fear of death, or grievous bodily harm, as mayhem or loss of limb, to do some lawful act, or to commit a misdemeanor. 1 Bl. Comm. 130; 4 Bl. Comm. 30; 4 Steph. Comm. 83. See METUS
In English law. Every person commits a misdemeanor, punishable with a fine or imprisonment, who wrongfully uses violence to or intimidates any other person, or his wife or children, with a view to compel him to abstain from doing, or to do, any act which he has a legal right to do, or abstain from doing. (St. 38 & 39 Vict, c. 80,
Any oppression by color or pretense of right, and particularly the exaction by an officer of money, by color of his office, either when none at all is due, or not so much is due. or wen it Is not yet due. Preston v. Bacon, 4 Conn. 4S0.Extortion consists in any public officer unlawfully taking, by color of his office, from any person any money or thing of value that is not due to him. or more than his due.
The wrongful act of an officer or other person in compelling payment of a fee or reward for his services, under color of his official authority, where no payment Is due. Between “extortion” and “exaction” there is this difference: that in the former case the officer extorts more than his due, when something is due to him; in the latter, he exacts what is not his due, when there is nothing due to him. Co. Litt. 368.
13) COLOR OF AUTHORITY
That semblance or presumption of authority sustaining the acts of a public officer which is derived from his apparent title to the office or from a writ or other process in his hands apparently valid and regular. State v. Oates, 80 Wis. 634, 57 N. W. 290, 39 Am. St. Rep. 912; Wyatt v. Monroe, 27 Tex. 208.
14) COLOR OF TITLE
The appearance, semblance, or simulacrum of title. Any fact, extraneous to the act or mere will of the claimant, which has the appearance, on its face, of supporting his claim of a present title to land, but which, for some defect, in reality falls short of establishing it. Wright v. Mattison, 18 How. 56, 15 L. Ed. 280; Cameron v. U. S
The misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inllicts upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury. 1 Russ. Crimes, 297; Steph. Dig. Crim. Law, 71. See U. S. v. Deaver (D. C.) 14 Fed. 597.
A deceitful agreement or compact between two or more persons, for the one party to bring an action against the other for some evil purpose, as to defraud a third party of his right Cowell. A secret arrangement between two or more persons, whose interests are apparently conflicting, to make use of the forms and proceedings of law in order to defraud a third person, or to obtain that which justice would not give them, by deceiving a court or it officers. Baldwin v. New York, 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 359; Belt v. Blackburn, 28 Md. 235; Railroad Co. v. Gay. 8G Tex. 571, 26 S. W. 599, 25 L. R. A. 52; Balch v. Beach, 119 Wis. 77, 95 N. W. 132.
An answer or plea is called “frivolous” when it is clearly insufficient on its face, and does not controvert the material points of the opposite pleading, and is presumably Interposed for mere purposes of delay or to embarrass the plaintiff. Ervvinv. Lowery, 64 N. C. 321; Strong v. Sproul, 53 N. Y. 499; Gray v. Gidiere, 4 Strob. (S. C.)442; Peacock v. Williams (C. C.) 110 Fed. 910.A frivolous demurrer has been defined to lie one which is so clearly untenable, or its insufficiency so manifest upon a bare inspection of the pleadings, that its character maybe determined without argument or research. Cottrill v. Cramer, 40 Wis. 558.Synonyms. The terms “frivolous” and “sham,” as applied to pleadings, do not mean the same thing. A sham plea is good on its face, but false in fact; it may, to all appearances, constitute a perfect defense, but is a pretence because false and because not pleaded in good faith. A frivolous plea may be perfectly true in its allegations, but yet is liable to be stricken out because totally insufficient in substance. Andrese v. Bandler(Sup.) 56 X. Y. Supp. 614; Brown v. Jenison, 1 Code R. N. S. (N. Y.) 157.
To fabricate evidence is to arrange or manufacture circumstances orindicia, after the fact committed, with the purpose of using them as evidence, and of deceitfully making them appear as if accidental or undesigned; to devise falsely or contrive by artifice with the intention to deceive. Such evidence may be wholly forged and artificial, or it may consist in so warping and distorting real facts as to create an erroneous impression in the minds of those who observe them and then presenting such impression as true and genuine.
In the Roman and civil law. A wrong or Injury: an offense; a violation of public or private duty.It will be observed that this word, taken in its most general sense, is wider in both directions than our English term “tort.” On the one hand, it includes those wrongful acts which, while directly affecting some individual or his property, yet extend in their injurious consequences to the peace or security of the community at large, and hence rise to the grade of crimes or misdemeanors. These acts were termed in the Roman law”public delicts:” while those for which the only penalty exacted was compensation to the person primarily injured were denominated “private delicts.” On the other hand, the term appears to have included injurious actions which transpired without any malicious intention on the part of the doer. Thus Pothier gives the name “quasi delicts” to the acts of a person who, without malignity, but by an inexcusable imprudence, causes an injury to another. Poth. Obi. 110. Rut the term is used in modern jurisprudence as a convenient synonym of “tort;” that is, a wrongful and injurious violation of a jus it. remor right available against all the world. This appears in the two contrasted phrases,”actions ex contractu” and “actions ex delicto.”Quasi delict. An act whereby a person, without malice, but by fault, negligence, or prudence not legally excusable, causes injury to another. Qui judex litem suam Jecit, being the offense of partiality or excess in thejudex, (juryman;) e. y., in assessing the damages at a ligure iu excess of the extremelimit permitted by the formula. Torts commuted by one’s agents (t y., stable-boys, shop-managers, etc.) in the course of their employment. Brown.
Lat. A delict, tort, wrong, injury, or offense. Actions ex dclicto are suchas are founded on a tort, as distinguished from actions on contract. Culpability, blameworthiness, or legal delinquency. The word occurs in this sense in the maxim, “In pari delicto inclior est conditio defendentis,” (which see.)A challenge of a juror propter delictum is for some crime or misdemeanor that affects his credit and renders him infamous. 3 Bl. Comm. .”03 ; 2 Kent, Comm. 241.
21) DE SON TORT
TORT. L. Fr. Of his own wrong. A stranger who takes upon him to act as an executor without any just authority is called an “executor of his own wrong,” (de son tort.) 2 Bl. Comm. 507; 2 Steph. Comm. 244.
22) NE UNQUES EXECUTOR
L. Fr. Never executor. The name of a plea by which the defendant denies that he is an executor, as he is alleged to be; or that the plaintiff is an executor, as he claims to be.
The offense of withholding or withdrawing from another man what by law he is entitled to. There are various descriptions of this offense, of which the principal are as follows: (1) Subtraction of suit and services, which is a species of injury affecting a man’s real property, and consists of a withdrawal of (or a neglect to perform or pay) the fealty, suit of court, rent, or services reserved by the lessor of the land.
See FORESTALL.Forstellarius est pauperum depressor et totius coinmunitntis et patria; pub- llcusiaimicus. 3 Inst. 190. A forestaller is an oppressor of the poor, and a public enemy of the whole community and country.
A technical word used in indictments for extortion.It is a sufficient averment of a corrupt intent, in an indictment for extortion, to allege that the defendant “extorsively” took the unlawful fee. Leeman v. State, 35 Ark.438, 37 Am. Rep. 44.
26) VETITUM NAMIUM
L. Lat Where the bailiff of a lord distrains beasts or goods of another, and the lord forbids the bailiff to deliver them when the sheriff comes to make replevin, the owner of the cattle may demand satisfaction in placitum de vetito namio. 2 Inst 140; 2 BL Comm. 148. VETO 1205 VICAR
Any misfeasance or act of one man whereby another is injuriously treated or damnified. 3 Bl. Comm. 208. An injury or misfeasance to the person, property, or rights of another person, done with force and violence, either actual or implied in law. See Grunson v. State, 89 Ind. 530, 46 Am. Rep. 178; Southern Ity. Co. v. Harden, 101 Ga. 203, 28 S. E. 847; Blood v. Kemp, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 173; Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. McLaughlin, 03 111. 391; Agnew v. Jones, 74 Miss. 347, 23 South. 25; Hill v. Kimball. 70 Tex. 210, 13 S. W. 59, 7 L. R. A. 618. In the strictest sense, an entry on another’s ground, without a lawful authority, and doing some damage, however inconsiderable, to his real property. 3 Bl. Comm. 209. Trespass, in its most comprehensive sense, signifies any transgression or offense against the law of nature, of society, or of the country in which we live; and this, whether it relates to a man’s person or to his property. In its more limited and ordinary sense, it signifies an injury committed with violence, and this violence may be either actual or implied; and the law will imply violence though none is actually used, when the injury is of a direct and immediate kind, and committed on the person or tangible and corporeal property of the plaintiff. Of actual violence, an assault and battery is an instance; of implied, a peaceable but wrongful entry upon a person’s land. Brown. In practice. A form of action, at the common law, which lies for redress in the shape of money damages for any unlawful ipjury done to the plaintiff, in respect either to his person, property, or rights, by the immediate force and violence of the defendant.
28) RECOGNITIONE ADNTJLLANDA PER VIM ET DURITIEM FACTA
A writ to the justices of the common bench for sending a record touching a recognizance, which the recognizor suggests was acknowledged by force and duress; that if it so appear the recognizance may be annulled. Reg. Orig. 183.
29) IN INVITUM
Against an unwilling party; against one not assenting. A term appliedto proceedings against an adverse party, to which he does not consent.
A reckless or malicious and intentional disregard of the property, rights, or safety of others, implying, actively, a licentious or contemptuous willingness to injure and disregard of the consequences to others, and, passively, more than mere negligence, that is, a conscious and Intentional disregard of duty. See Brasington v. South Bound R. Co., 02 S. C. 325, 40 S. E. 005, 89 Am. St. Rep. 905; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Webb, 97 Ala. 30S, 12 South. 374; Branch v. State, 41 Tex. 625; Harward v. Davenport, 105 Iowa, 592, 75 N. W. 4S7; Trauerman v. Lippincott, 39 Mo. App. 4S8; Everett v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 121 N. C. 519. 27 S. E. 991; Birmingham Ry. & El. Co. v. Pincltard, 124 Ala. 372, 26 South. 8S0. Reckless sport; willfully unrestrained action, running immoderately into excess. Cobb v. Bennett, 75 Pa. 330, 15 Am. Rep. 752. A licentious act by one man towards the person of another, without regard to his rights; as, for example, if a man should attempt to pull off another’s hat against his will, in order to expose him to ridicule, the offense would be an assault, and If he touched him It would amount to a battery. Bouvier. BL.LAW DICT.(2D ED.)
THE COURT’S ROLE AS PUBLIC TRUSTEES
1) PUBLIC TRUSTEE: RCW 42.52.010 Definitions
“State officer” means every person holding a position of PUBLIC OFFICE in or under an executive, legislative, or judicial office of the state. “State officer” includes judges of the superior court, judges of the court of appeals, justices of the supreme court, members of the legislature together with the secretary of the senate and the chief clerk of the house of representatives, holders of elective offices in the executive branch of state government, chief executive officers of state agencies, members of boards, commissions, or committees with authority over one or more state agencies or institutions, and employees of the state who are engaged in supervisory, policy-making, or policy-enforcing work. For the purposes of this chapter, “state officer” also includes any person exercising or undertaking to exercise the powers or functions of a state officer.
A PUBLIC OFFICER, appointed to preside and to administer the law in a court of justice; the chief member of a court, and charged with the control of proceedings and the decision of questions of law or discretion. Todd v. U. S
3) PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
The name of the PUBLIC OFFICER (in several states) who is appointed in each judicial district, circuit, or county, to conduct criminal prosecutions on behalf of the state or people. See People v. May, 3 Mich. 605; Holder v. State, 58 Ark. 473, 25 S. W. 279.
An employment on behalf of the government in any station or PUBLIC TRUST, not merely transient, occasional, or incidental. In re Attorneys’ Oaths, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 493. The most frequent occasions to use the word arise with reference to a duty and power conferred on an individual by the government; and, when this is the connection, “public office” is a usual and more discriminating expression. It is a general rule that a judicial office cannot be exercised by deputy, while a ministerial one may. Waldo v. Wallace, 12 Ind. 569. “Office” Is frequently used in the old books as an abbreviation for “inquest of office,” (q. v.)
5) LEGAL DUTY
An obligation arising from contract of the parties or the operation of the law. Riddell v. Ventilating Co., 27 Mont. 44, 69 Pac. 241. That which the law requires to be done or forborne to a determinate person or the public at large, correlative to avested and coextensive right in such person or the public, and the breach of which constitutes negligence. Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q. B. Div. 506; Smith v. Clarke HardwareCo., 100 Ga. 163, 28 S. E. 73, 39 L. R. A. 607; Railroad Co. v. Ballentine, 84 Fed. 935, 28 C. C. A. 572
6) OFFICIAL BOND
A bond given by a public officer, conditioned that he shall well and faithfully perform all the duties of the office. The term is sometimes made to include the bonds of executors, guardians, trustees, etc.
As occasionally used in statutes prescribing the qualifications of public officers, trustees, etc., this term means soundness of moral principle and character, as shown by one person dealing with others in the making and performance of contracts, and fidelity and honesty in the discharge of trusts; it is . synonymous with “probity,” “honesty,” and “uprightness.” In re Bau- quier’s Estate, 88 Cal. 302, 26 Pac. 178; In re Gordons Estate, 142 Cal. 125, 75 Pac. 672.
As used in bonds of public and private officers, this term imports not only honesty, but also a punctilious discharge of all the duties of the ofiice, requiring competence, diligence, and attention, without any malfeasance or nonfeasance, aside from mere mistakes. State v. Chadwick, 10 Or. 408; Hoboken v. Evans, 31 N. J. Law,343; Harris v. Hanson, 11 Me. 245 ; American Bank v. Adams, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 300;Union Bank v. Clossey, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 273; Perry v. Thompson, 10 N. J. Law, 73.
THE PERSON APPOINTED, OR REQUIRED BY LAW, TO EXECUTE A TRUST; one in whom an estate, interest, or power is vested, under an express or implied agreement to administer or exercise it for the benefit or to the use of another.
Two or more relations, offices, functions, or rights which cannot naturally, or may not legally, exist in or be exercised by the same person at the same time, are said to be incompatible. Thus, the relations of lessor and lessee of the same land, in one person at the same time, are incompatible. So of trustee and beneficiary of the same property. See People v. Greeu, 4G How. Prac.
The term is derived from the Roman law, and means (as a noun) a person holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to that of a trustee,in respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good faith and candor which it requires. Thus, a person is a fiduciary who is invested with rights and powers to be exercised for the benefit of another person. Svanoe v. Jurgens, 144 111.507, 33 N. E. 955; Stoll v. King, 8 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 299.As an adjective it means of the nature of a trust; having the characteristics of a trust; analogous to a trust; relating to or founded upon a trust or confidence.
RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY AUTHORITY OF THE LAW
In the civil law this term corresponds nearly to our “cestuique trust.” It designates a person who has the real or beneficial interest in an estate or fund, the title or administration of which is temporarily confided to another. See Story,Eq. Jur.
2) PEREMPTORY DEFENSE
A defense which insists that the plaintiff never had the right to institute the suit, or that, if he had, the original right is extinguished or determined.
3) BENEFICIAL ENJOYMENT
The enjoyment which a man has of an estate in his own right and for his own benefit, and not as trustee for another. 11 H. L. Cas. 271.
The repudiation or renunciation of a right or claim vested in a person of which he had formerly alleged to be his. The refusal, waiver, or denial of an estate or right offered to a person. The disavowal, denial, or renunciation of an Interest, right, or property imputed to a person or alleged to be his. Also the declaration, or the instrument, by which such disclaimer is published. Moores v. Clackamas County, 40 Or.536, 67 Pac. 662.Of estates. The act by which a party refuses to accept an estate which has been conveyed to him. Thus, a trustee is said to disclaim who releases to his fellow-trustees his estate, and relieves himself of the trust. Watson v. Watson, 13 Conn. 85; KentuckyUnion Co. v. Cornett, 112 Ky. 677, 66 S. W. 728.
5) IN PERSON
A party, plaintiff or defendant, who sues out a writ or other process, or appears to conduct his case in court himself, instead of through a solicitor or counsel, is said to act and appear in person.
the nature or partaking of the qualities of human beings, or of movable property. As to personal “Action,” “Assets,” “Chattels,” “Contract,” “Covenant,” “Credit,” “De- mand,” “Disability,” “Franchise,” “Injury,” “Judgment,” “Knowledge,” “Law,” “Liability.” “Liberty.” “Notice,” “Property.” “Replevin,” “Representatives.” “Rights,” “Security,” “Service,” “Servitude,” “Statute,” “Tax,” “Tithes,” “Tort,” and “Warranty,” see those titles. Personal things cannot be done by another. Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 14. Personal things cannot be granted over. Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 15. Personal things die with the person. Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 16. Personalia personam seqnnntnr. Personal things follow the person. Flanders v. Cross, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 516.
NOT SUBJECT TO ALIENATION ; THE CHARACTERISTIC OF THOSE THINGS WHICH CANNOT BE BOUGHT OR SOLD OR TRANSFERRED FROM ONE PERSON TO ANOTHER, SUCH AS RIVERS AND PUBLIC HIGHWAYS, AND CERTAIN PERSONAL RIGHTS; E. G., LIBERTY.
Incapable of being aliened, that is, sold and transferred
This word has had various meanings at different stages of history. In the Roman law, it denoted one who was either born free or emancipated, and was the OPPOSITE OF “SLAVE.” In feudal law, it designated an allodial proprietor, as distinguished from a vassal or feudal tenant. (And so in Pennsylvania colonial law. Fry’s Election Case,71 Pa. 308, 10 Am. Rep. 098.) In old English law, the word described a freeholder or tenant by free services; one who was not a villain. In modern legal phraseology, it is the appellation of a member of a city or borough having the right of suffrage, or a member of any municipal corporation invested with full civic rights. A person in the possession and enjoyment of all the civil and political rights accorded to the people under a free government.
Unconstrained; having power to follow the dictates of his own will. Not subject to the dominion of another. Not compelled to involuntary servitude. Used in this sense as opposed to “slave.”2. Not bound to service for a fixed term of years; in distinction to being bound as an apprentice.3. Enjoying full civic rights.4. Available to all citizens alike without charge; as a free school.5. Available for public use without charge or toll; as a free bridge.6. Not despotic; assuring liberty; defending individual rights against encroachment by any person or class; instituted by a free people; said of governments, institutions, etc.
The state of being free; liberty; self-determination; absence of restraint;the opposite of slavery.The power of acting, in the character of a moral personality, according to thedictates of the will, without other check, hindrance, or prohibition than such as may beimposed by just and necessary laws and the duties of social life.The prevalence, in the government and constitution of a country, of such a systemof laws and institutions as secure civil liberty to the individual citizen.
12) JUS PENITENDI
In Roman law, the right of rescission or revocation of an executory contract 011 failure of the other party to fulfill his part of the agreement. See Mackeld. Rom. Law,
The possession of sovereign power; supreme political authority; paramount control of the constitution and frame of government and Its administration ; the self-sufficient source of political power, from which all specific political powers are derived; the international independence of a state, combined with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign dictation; also a political society, or state, which is sovereign and independent. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 455, 1 L. Ed. 440: Union Bank v. Hill, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 325; Moore v. Shaw, 17 Cal. 218, 79 Am. Dec. 123. “The freedom of the nation has its correlate in the sovereignty of the nation. Political sovereignty is the assertion of the self-determinate will of the organic people, and in this there is the manifestation of its freedom. It is in and through the determination of its sovereignty that the order of the nation is constituted and maintained.” Mulford, Nation, p. 129.
14) PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS
As used in coustitutioual law, this right includes personal freedom, freedom of contract, exemption from oppression or invidious discrimination, the right to follow one’s individual preference in the choice of an occupation and the application of his energies, liberty of conscience, and the right to enjoy the domestic relations and the privileges of the family and the home. Black, Const. Law (3d Ed.) p. 544. See Ruhstrat v. People, 185 111. 133, 57 N. E. 41, 49 L R. A. 181, 76 Am. St. Rep. 30; Hooper v. California, 105 U. S. 648, 15 S. Ct. 207, 39 L. Ed. 297; Butchers’ Union, etc., Co. v. Crescent City Live Stock, etc., Co., Ill U. S. 740, 4 Sup. Ct. 652, 28 L. Ed. 585.
15) RIGHT OF HABITATION
created by law and depend upon civilized society; or they are those which are plainly assured by natural law (Borden v. State, 11 Ark. 519, 44 Am. Dec. 217); or those which, by fair deduction from the present physical, moral, social, and religious characteristics of man, he must be invested with, and which he ought to have realized for him in a jural society, in order to fulfill the ends to which his nature calls him. 1 Woolsey, Polit. Science, p. 20. Such are the rights of life, liberty, privacy, and good reputation. See Black, Const. Law (3d Ed.) 523. Civil rights are such as belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider seuse, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of government. They include the rights of property, marriage, protection by the laws, freedom of contract, trial by jury, etc. See Winnett v. Adams, 71 Neb. 817, 99 N. W. 081. Or, as otherwise defined, civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Bights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action. Also a term applied to certain rights secured to citizens of the United States by the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to the constitution, and by various acts of congress made in pursuance thereof. Iowa v. Railroad Co. (C. C.) 37 Fed. 498, 3 L. R. A. 554; State v. Powers, 51 N. J. Law, 432, 17 Atl. 909; Bowles v. Ilabermann, 95 N. Y. 247; People v. Washington, 30 Cal. 05S; Fletcher v. Tuttle, 151 111. 41, 37 N. E. 083, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220; llronek v. People, 134 111. 139, 24 N. E. 801, 8 L. R. A. 837, 23 Am. St Rep. 052. Political rights consist in the power to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, such as the right of citizenship, that of suffrage, the right to hold public office, and the right of petition. See Black Const. Law (3d Ed.) 524; Winnett v. Adams, 71 Neb. 817, 99 N. W. 081. Personal rights is a term of rather vague import, but generally it may be said to mean the right of personal security, comprising those of life, limb, body, health, reputation, and the right of personal liberty. Ai an adjective, the term “right” means just, morally correct, consonant with ethical principles or rules of positive law. It is the opposite of wrong, unjust illegal. “Right” is used in law, as well as in ethics, as opposed to “wrong.” Thus, a person may acquire a title by wrong. In old English law. The term denoted an accusation or charge of crime. Fitzh. Nat Brev. 66 F. See, also, DROIT; JUS; RECHT. Other compound and descriptive terms. Base right. In Scotch law, a subordinate right; the right of a subvassal in the lands held by him. Bell.
Freedom; exemption from extraneous control. The power of the will, in its moral freedom, to follow the dictates of its unrestricted choice, and to direct the external acts of the individual without restraint, coercion, or control from other persons. See Booth v. Illinois, 1S4 U. S. 425, 22 Sup. Ct. 425, 46 L. Ed. 623 ; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 142. 24 L. Ed. 77; People v. Warden of City Prison. 157 N. Y. 116, 51 N. E. 1006. 43 L. R. A. 264, 68 Am. St. Rep. 7i
The defaulting and dishonoring party will be foreclosed on by latches and estopped from maintaining or enforcing the original offer in any court or administrative unit and you agree that the Undersigned may exercise her exclusive remedy as to the stipulated and agreed upon misapplication of the statue, unlawful search and seizure, malicious prosecution. THE DEFAULTING OR DISHONORING PARTY
AS AGENTS, SPEAKS FOR STATE IN THIS MATTER AND BINDS THE STATE TO ANY MONETARY DAMAGES FOR INJURIES AS SO STIPULATED BY YOU,
I attest to the fact that I am the Executor, Dual Administrator, and Beneficiary of the Estate of BRANDIA TAAMU and was and always have been before the matter before the courts today. As the Executor of the Estate state on my own unlimited liability, say that I have read the above affidavit, and do know the contents to be true, correct, complete and not misleading, the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth in accordance with God and Man’s Law.
SCIRE LEGES NON HOC EST VERBA EARUM TENERE, SED VIM AC POTESTATEM.
To know the laws is not to observe their mere words, but their force and power; I that is, the essential meaning in which their efficacy resides.] Dig. 1, 3, 17; 1 Kent Comm. 402. Scire propria est rem ratione et per causam cognoscere. To know properly is to know a thing in its reason, and by its cause. We are truly said to know anything, where we know the true cause thereof. Co. Litt 1836.
“Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, which sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, Sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exist and acts.” Supreme Court Decision, Woo Lee vs. Hopkins 118 U.S. 356
Brandia Taamu (Electronic Signature)
Executor for the Estate of BRANDIA TAAMU
UCC 42 3-402 SIGNATURE BY REPRESENTATIVE